

## Curriculum Vitae

Dr. Christopher Cowie  
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### Academic Positions

- 2020-present Associate Professor. University of Durham.  
2020 Visiting Research Scholar. Stanford University.  
2017-2020 Assistant Professor. University of Durham.  
2015-17 Research Fellow. Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge.  
2010-14 PhD in Philosophy (Cambridge) and Visiting Research Student (Princeton).

### Publications

#### **Books (Single-Author Monographs)**

- *Morality and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2019).
- *The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry*. Routledge. (2020).

#### **Books (Edited Collections)**

- *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. Edited with Richard Rowland. Routledge. (2019).

#### **Chapters in Books and Collections**

- Introduction. In C. Cowie and R. Rowland (eds). *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. (2019).
- Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Morality and Mathematics. In C. Cowie and R. Rowland (eds). *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. (2019).
- Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Robin McKenna and Christos Kyriacou (eds). *Epistemic Realism and Antirealism: Approaches to Metaepistemology*. McKenna, Robin & Kyriacou, Christos. Palgrave Macmillan. (Forthcoming). Co-written with Alexander Greenberg. (2019).
- Metanormativity as a Method. In Jussi Suikkanen (ed). *Methodology and Moral Philosophy*. Routledge. (2019).

#### **Journal Articles**

- What Are Paradoxes? *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*. Forthcoming.
- The 'Oumuamua Controversy: A Philosophical Perspective. *Nature Astronomy* 5: 526-7. (2021)
- A New Argument for Moral Error Theory. *Nous*. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12357. (2020).
- Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox? *Philosophical Studies* 177(6), 1685-1702. (2019).
- Companions in Guilt Arguments. *Philosophy Compass*. October (2018).
- Poorer without it? The neglected role of the natural environment in poverty and wellbeing. *Sustainable Development* 26(1): 83-98. (2018). Co-written with Judith Schleicher, Marija Schaafsma, Chris Sandbrook, Fiona Danks and Bhaskar Vira.
- Does the Repugnant Conclusion Have Any Probative Force? *Philosophical Studies*. 174(12): 3012-3039. (2017).
- Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Forthcoming in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98(S1). (2016). Co-written with Alexander Greenberg.
- Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. 19(3): 711-723. (2016).
- Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Companions in Guilt

- Strategies. *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94(1): 115-130. (2016).
- Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. *Metaphilosophy* 46(4): 605-619. (2015).
  - Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (256): 407-422. (2014).
  - In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity. *Synthese* 191(16): 4003-4017. (2014).
  - A New Explanatory Challenge for Non-Naturalists. T. Cuneo (ed.) *Res Philosophica* 91(4): 661- 679. (2014).
  - Epistemic Disagreement and Moral Disagreement. *Erkenntnis* 79(1): 191-209. (2013).

### **Recent Invited Talks (2019-present)**

- Colloquium Talk. *Groningen*. (March 2022).
- Should Non-Consequentialists be Long-Termists? Invited speaker at the Global Priorities Institute, *University of Oxford* (December 2021).
- A New Argument for Moral Error Theory. *Invited speaker* at Stockholm University (December 2020).
- Impossibility Theorems, Fixed Points and Error Theory. *Invited keynote* at University of Cyprus Normative Rationalism (May 2020).
- Groundwork for a Theory of Significance. *Moral Philosophy Group* (Pre-Read). Stanford University. (January 2020).
- Probability for Epistemic Reductionists and Error Theorists. *Epistemology Seminar*. University of Oxford. (November 2019).
- A Theory of Significance. *Department Seminar*. University of Nottingham. (November 2019).
- Probability for Epistemic Error Theorists and Reductionists. *Normativity Conference*. Frankfurt. September 2019.
- The Repugnant Conclusion and Quality of Life. *British Society for Ethical Theory*. University of Glasgow. (July 2019).
- Morality and Epistemic Judgment. *Colloquium Speaker*. University of Zurich. (April 2019)
- The Repugnant Conclusion and Quality of Life. *Senior Seminar*. University of Sheffield. (March 2019).