

Curriculum Vitae

Dr. Christopher Cowie
Associate Professor
University of Durham
christopher.d.cowie@durham.ac.uk

Academic Positions

- 2020-present Associate Professor. University of Durham.
2020 Visiting Research Scholar. Stanford University.
2017-2020 Assistant Professor. University of Durham.
2015-17 Research Fellow. Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge.
2010-14 PhD in Philosophy (Cambridge) and Visiting Research Student (Princeton).

Publications

Books (Single-Author Monographs)

- *Morality and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2019).
- *The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry*. Routledge. (2020).

Books (Edited Collections)

- *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. Edited with Richard Rowland. Routledge. (2019).

Chapters in Books and Collections

- Introduction. In C. Cowie and R. Rowland (eds). *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. (2019).
- Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Morality and Mathematics. In C. Cowie and R. Rowland (eds). *Companions in Guilt Argument in Metaethics*. (2019).
- Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Robin McKenna and Christos Kyriacou (eds). *Epistemic Realism and Antirealism: Approaches to Metaepistemology*. McKenna, Robin & Kyriacou, Christos. Palgrave Macmillan. (Forthcoming). Co-written with Alexander Greenberg. (2019).
- Metanormativity as a Method. In Jussi Suikkanen (ed). *Methodology and Moral Philosophy*. Routledge. (2019).

Journal Articles

- Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory. *The Journal of Philosophy*. Forthcoming.
- Arguing about Extraterrestrial Intelligence. *The Philosophical Quarterly*. Forthcoming.
- What Are Paradoxes? *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*. Forthcoming.
- The 'Oumuamua Controversy: A Philosophical Perspective. *Nature Astronomy* 5: 526-7. (2021)
- A New Argument for Moral Error Theory. *Nous*. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12357. (2020).
- Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox? *Philosophical Studies* 177(6), 1685-1702. (2019).
- Companions in Guilt Arguments. *Philosophy Compass*. October (2018).
- Poorer without it? The neglected role of the natural environment in poverty and wellbeing. *Sustainable Development* 26(1): 83-98. (2018). Co-written with Judith Schleicher, Marija Schaafsma, Chris Sandbrook, Fiona Danks and Bhaskar Vira.
- Does the Repugnant Conclusion Have Any Probative Force? *Philosophical Studies*: 174(12): 3012-3039. (2017).
- Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Forthcoming in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98(S1). (2016). Co-written with Alexander Greenberg.
- Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. *Ethical*

- Theory and Moral Practice*. 19(3): 711-723. (2016).
- Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Companions in Guilt Strategies. *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94(1): 115-130. (2016).
 - Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. *Metaphilosophy* 46(4): 605-619. (2015).
 - Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (256): 407-422. (2014).
 - In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity. *Synthese* 191(16): 4003-4017. (2014).
 - A New Explanatory Challenge for Non-Naturalists. T. Cuneo (ed.) *Res Philosophica* 91(4): 661- 679. (2014).
 - Epistemic Disagreement and Moral Disagreement. *Erkenntnis* 79(1): 191-209. (2013).